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THE STONECUTTERS' CASE--STRIKES ON "UNFAIR" MATERIAL
ENTERING INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The decision in the Stonecutter Case ' recently decided by the
United States Supreme Court has been strongly criticized as
IBedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U. S.
37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522 (1927). In the dissenting opinion, in which Justice
Holmes concurred, Justice Brandeies said:
"If, on the undisputed facts of this case, refusal to work can be enjoined,
Congress created by the Sherman Law and the Clayton Act an instrument
for imposing restraints upon labor which reminds of involuntary servitude."
C841
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another and serious encroachment on the activity of organized
labor.2
Indiana limestone is quarried and fabricated by a group of
companies, largely Indiana corporations, which, together, ship
70% of all the cut stone in the country. These companies, twenty-
four in number, make 75% of their sales in interstate commerce.
Until 1921 they had made contracts with the Journeymen's Stone-
cutter Association under which they employed its members. In
that year a disagreement arose; the companies refused to renew
the contracts; a strike occurred followed by a lockout; and the
companies organized an independent union "with the effect of
closing their shops and quarries against the members of the
General Union." The union in the hope of forcing the companies
again to employ union labor directed its members throughout
the country not to work on stone "that had been started, planed,
turned, cut, or semi-finished by men working in opposition to
our organization"; and declared that stone produced by the peti-
tioners was "unfair." The twenty-four companies sued to enjoin
the union from such procedure on the ground that it violated the
Federal Anti-Trust Act.3 The Federal District Court refused
a preliminary injunction and on final hearing dismissed the de-
cree. On appeal this decree was affirmed. In April, 1927, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower
courts and granted the injunction.
Mr. Justice Sutherland, who rendered the majority opinion,
states that neither the General Union nor the locals had any
grievance against the local purchasers of such stone, and from
this concludes that the strikes "were ordered and conducted for
the sole purpose of preventing the use, and consequently, the
sale and shipment in interstate commerce, of petitioners' product,
in order, by threatening the loss or serious curtailment of their
interstate market, to force petitioners to the alternative of com-
2 Witte, Joztrneymin Sto~w Cattcrs Decision (1927) 17 A.,ErL Lxn. LrG.
REv. 139, 140, 141. "Henceforth, it must be regarded as settled law that all
strikes against the use of non-union material are unlawful, and that in most
cases, the anti-trust laws can be invoked against them.
.. "This is very different from what organized labor has always believed
to be the law, that the right to strike is absolute and that workmen may
strike for any or no reason.
. Beyond question the law of labor combinations in this country has
constantly become more and more unfavorable to labor. The Clayton Act
and the State anti-injunction laws have proved valuelezs:.
Edward E. Witte, author of the above article, was Secretary of the In-
dustrial Commission of Wisconsin from 1917-1922 and since thcn has been
Chief of the Wisconsin Legislative reference Library. He has published
numerous articles and is the author of the section of the "Law of Conspir-
acy" in Commons and Andrews, Principlcs of Labor Leghlatoai (1920).
3 26 Stat. 209 (1890), U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 8820.
&9 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925).
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ing to undesired terms with the members of the union." It is
equally consistent with the facts, however, to say that the "sole
purpose" was not to interfere with the distribution of plaintiff's
product, and even less with interstate commerce as such. The
defendant union was not interested in that of itself, but was
rather trying to. get the plaintiffs to operate their shops again
on a union basis as a defensive measure necessary to secure or
strengthen its position in the bargaining struggle.0
5 See, Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, supra
note 4, at 40: ". .. manifest object . . was to induce appellants to make
a contract with the union for employment of only union stone cutters in the
Indiana limestone District. It does not appear that .. any other building
operation was sought to be interfered with, and no actual or threatened
violence appears, no picketing, no boycotting, and nothing of that character."
Professor Cook in an article some years ago, Act, Intention, and Motivo
in the Criminal Law (1917) 26 YAE LAW JOURNAL 645 distinguished be-
tween "intent" and "motive". He pointed out that "an actor intends a
particular consequence when either (1) he wishes or desires it to happen
as the result of the act which he does for the purpose of bringing about
the result in question; or (2) when at the time he does the act he adverts
to the consequence in question as one which will necessarily result from the
act and this even if he would be glad to have this particular consequence
not happen if he could avoid it and still bring about the consequence which
he has primarily in view." He then pointed out that "nearly all conse-
quences which are intended and desired by the one whose act produces them
are not desired for their own sake. The actor has in view some more
remote consequence . . . which he is seeking to bring to pass by means
of these . . . more immediate consequences . .. The desire and in-
tentiorl to bring about this ulterior consequence, which is the end, rather
than merely a means to an end, seems to be what is meant in many cases
by motive." Cook then asks whether it may "not turn out to be true that
in many cases whether a crime has been committed will depend upon the
motive with which the acts that have produced certain results were done?"
Even if it were admitted that the union in the instant case was to inter-
fere with interstate commerce as a foreseen necessary consequence of the
order not to work on the plaintiffs' product, the motive of the union under
such an analysis would be seen to be the reinstatement of its former rela-
tionship with the plaintiffs.
"Sole purpose" is used by Sutherland, J. as synonymous with "intent" as
used by Cook, but the Justice seems to attach to it the same consequences
as though it also constituted the "motive." It is submitted that the term
"sole purpose" should have been limited to "intent" and that "ultimate end
in view" should have been limited to "motive" as above defined.
For an earlier expression of similar views, see Jeremiah Smith, Crucial
Issues in Labor Litigation (1907) 20 HAnv. L. 1REv. 253, 345, 429.
6 Cf. Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604, 615, 19 Sup. Ct. 50, 54
(1898) : "Where the subject matter of the agreement does not directly re-
late to and act upon . . interstate commerce, and where the undisputed facts
clearly show that the purpose . . was not to regulate, obstruct, or restrain
that commerce, but that it was entered into with the object of properly..
regulating the.. business in which the parties . . were engaged, such agree-
ment will be upheld as not within the statute, when it can be seen that the
character and terms of the agreement are well calculated to attain the pur-
pose for which it was formed, and where the effect of its formation and
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The question before the court, was, whether, in the presence
of identity of interest in employee groups belonging to a single
national union, two factors-geographical separation of the
group members, and the entrance of goods into interstate com-
merce-should be sufficient to hold combinations unlawful where
there is a mere refusal to work on "unfair material." In reiterat-
ing that the general order to strike against the petitioners' prod-
uct could have no purpose other than that of coercing or induc-
ing the local employers to refrain from purchasing such product,
the court seems to minimize the importance of the re-organization
of the petitioners' shops and quarries, although in a later part
of the decision, it conceded that this was the ultimate end in
view.
That the stone had ceased to be in process of transportation
before the order could take effect, the court held to be immaterial,
although it added that "interference for a purely local object
with its use, with no intention, express or implied, to restrain
interstate commerce, it may be assumed would not have been a
violation of the anti-trust Act." This raises a second question.
What kind of an actual situation in a bargaining struggle can
fulfill the requirement of "interference for a purely local object?"
With the development of industries on a national scale there
have gradually grown up great organizations of employers and
of wage-earners. There are today both national associations of
employers and national labor unions in various trades. They
must, however, function in different fashion. The benefits of
strict organization are more quickly apparent to an employer
than they are to an ordinary employee, because the resulting
economic advantages in the case of the former are concentrated
in the hands of a single individual or small group of individuals,
whereas in the latter they are likely to be distributed among thou-
sands of employees. It is possible, and probably even advantage-
ous, for entrepreneurs to combine without the inevitable knowl-
edge of outsiders. When the United States Steel Corporation was
indicted for violation of the Anti-Trust Act in 1920,1 it was
found to be a holding corporation composed of 180 corporations
which controlled 80-90% of the total output of steel in the coun-
enforcement upon interstate trade . . is, in any event, but indirect and
incidental, and not its purpose or object."
In the instant case the court does not pause to consider (1) whether the
purpose was the proper regulation of industrial conditions (the business
in which the trade union was engaged) and (2) whether the terms and
character of the combination were well calculated to attain the purpose for
-which it was formed.
The instant case can be distinguished from such cases as Burnham v.
Dowd, 217 Mass. 351, 104 N. E. 841 (1914), where no one of the members
of the defendant union was or ever had been employed by the plaintiff.
7 United States v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. CL 293 (1920).
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try. The efficiency of the combination was achieved by a varied
and complicated system, the court saying, "its power was efficient
only when in cooperation with its competitors, and hence it con-
certed with them in the expedients of pools, associations,, trade
meetings, and finally in a system of dinners inaugurated by the
president of the company, E. H. Gary, and called 'the Gary
Dinners'." Such a combination was held not to be in violation
of the Sherman Law, although, in the dissenting opinion, Jus-
tices Day, Pitney, and Clarke held that the combination was one
between competitors in violation of law and intended to destroy
competition and to restrain trade directly. In the Industial As-
sociation Case,8 a group of building contractors and dealers in
building materials with the purpose of ending Trade Union domi-
nation and establishing the "open shop" plan required of builders,
as a condition of obtaining certain material, the presentation of
a permit from the Builders Exchange, such permits being refused
to those who did not support the plan.
A trade union, on the other hand, must appeal openly to its
members in order to coordinate their efforts and direct their
activities since it deals with a larger and less disciplined group.
Furthermore, it is hardly possible for any one of the national
unions to attempt work of consequence in any part of the country
which shall not be more than local both in purpose and effect.
Each local unit has come to be a link in a national and interna-
tional chain giving aid to and receiving aid from both the other
links and the chain as a whole. The activities of workers who are
organized along the typically conservative lines of those in the
American Federation of Labor, cannot be purely local in effect.
Can they be "purely local" in object? Perhaps this inevitable
difference in method as between employers and employees may
be one explanatin of why the court seems prone to frown less
on the activity of the former than on that of the latter.0
The court in the instant case adopts the frequently used major
premise that employers and the public are entitled to uninter-
8 Industrial Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 64, 45 Sup. Ct. 403
(1925).
9 Tilbury v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 7 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925)
(employers' registration system which prevented plaintiff from obtaining
employment in interstate commerce, held not to be within Sherman Law).
But see United States v. American Column & Lumber Co., 263 Fed. 147
(W. D. Tenn. 1920) (elaborate scheme by leading hardwood lumber dealers
in U. S., making use of central statistician and weekly reports, to eliminato
competition and maintain and even increase high war prices, held within
Sherman Law); Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U. S.
600, 34 Sup. Ct. 951 (1914) (circularization of retail lumber dealers' mom'
bers of association as to which wholesalers engaged in interstate commerce
sold directly to the consumer, with intent and effect of inducing boycott on
such wholesalers, held a violation of the Sherman Law, even in the absence
of agreement by members to boycott).
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rupted production in the absence of some justification for a
strike. After reading of the activities of the plaintiffs, which
preceded both the original strike and the present controversy in
the instant case, it is submitted that some thought should be
given to the question of whether employees and the public are
not entitled to "reasonably" sound labor conditions as a neces-
sary factor in maintaining uninterrupted production. When
employers organize, their activity, at least at first glance, ap-
pears to be in furtherance of commercial enterprise, while the
activity of organized labor must on its face seem to be an impedi-
ment thereto. It has been pointed out "I that labor generally
seems to be the aggressor in the struggle:
"It is battering at the employer's defenses, seeking a change
in the status quo. The employer is generally on the defensive,
since he either desires no change in conditions or he favors a
revision downward. When the employer reduces wages or in-
creases hours he is really the aggressor, but he does not appear
to be, because he does not attract attention unless the workers
protest. If the protest takes the form of a strike, the laborers
appear to be the aggressors almost as much as if they were strik-
ing for an improvement in their conditions, instead of against
a reduction."
Only after searching all the facts in each particular case can
the court decide whether on the one hand, the activity of the
employer will stifle enterprise, flood or scant the market, lower
working conditions so as to injure potential man-power, etc., or
in fact aid production and distribution in the long run, and on
the other whether the activity of the employees may create better
social conditions resulting in more efficient production, or in fact
merely hurt and impede production and distribution. Unless a
court makes such an inquiry its conclusions can be regarded
merely as a logical deduction from an unexamined major premise.
The instant case distinguishes the United Lcatli . Wo'uicrs
Case," in that there "the decision rests upon the ground that
there was an entire absence of evidence or circumstance to show
that the defendants, in their conspiracy to coerce the com-
plainants, were directing the scheme against interstate commerce.
The workers who boycotted goods were employed in a process
of production which took place in one spot." A distinction based
on this ground deprives members of a single union of the privi-
:o FrrcH, TnE CAusEs OF INDUSTRAL UMs sT (1924) 1.
"United Leather Workers v. Herkert, 265 U. S. 457, 44 Sup. Ct. 623
(1924) (strike coupled with illegal picketing against manufacturcro in-
tended to prevent the manufacture of articles held not within Sherman Law,
although strikers knew products were to be shipped in interstate comrarce
to fill orders given and accepted by purchasers in other states, unlccs stril.-
ers interferred with free transport and delivery of products to destination,
in other states, or with sales in other states).
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lege of refusing to work on "unfair goods" because the refusal
took place after they had been shipped in interstate coinmerce
instead of before, although, as Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out,
the question should be not whether any restraint of interstate
commerce, but whether an unreasonable restraint, occurred. After
distinguishing the first Coronado Case 12 on similar grounds, the
majority opinion concludes that the Duplex Case 13 controls and
"might serve as an opinion in this case," since "this court held
that complainant's business of manufacturing presses and dis-
posing of them in commerce was a property right entitled to
protection against unlawful injury or interference." Justice
Sanford concurred "on the controlling authority of the Duplex
Case," and Justice Stone likewise found himself bound by that
decision but stated, in a separate opinion, that he should have
doubted the applicability of the Sherman Act to such facts were
this an original proposition. Justice Stone points out that
although there may have been additional facts in the Duplex
Case (coercion and intimidation, appeal to outsiders to join in
boycott, etc.), the decree enjoined the defendants even from
persuasion, so failing to realize that where different facts,
harsher in circumstances and including violence, are laid before
a court, they will almost inevitably evoke a decision aimed to
quell the whole disturbance. In a recent NeN York case, 1' the
Court said:
". .. where unlawful picketing has been continued, where
violence and intimidation have been used, and where misstate-
ments as to the employer's business have been distributed, a
broad injunction prohibiting all picketing may be granted. The
course of conduct of the strikers has been such as to indicate the
danger of injury to property if any picketing whatever is allowed.
Such is not this case."
This attitude shows the trend of the more liberal courts in
labor cases, where the decisions seem to recognize the necessity
for concerted action on the part of wage-earners, and, therefore,
12 The United Mine Workers v. The Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344,
42 Sup. Ct. 570 (1922).
13 Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921).
The plaintiffs were engaged in the manufacture of printing presses. The
defendants, officers, and members of a labor organization, whose members
were in the employ of the plaintiff, warned the latter's customers that it
would be better for them not to purchase presses made by the plaintiff,
threatened customers with sympathetic strike in other trades, notified a
trucking company not to carry plaintiff's goods, etc. The plaintiff brought
suit under the Clayton Act for an injunction which was granted. The
court also cited Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908),
where a similar result had been reached before the passage of the Clayton
Act.
14 Exchange Bakery & Restaurant Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N.
E. 130, 135 (1927).
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limit judicial interference to activities which seem unreasonable
in the light of all the facts involved.'G
The instant court refers in its opinion to interference with
interstate commerce as the "direct object" to be attained.c It
then proceeds, however, to admit that the "ultimate end" was not
interference with interstate commerce but unionization of the
shops. It would seem that once the court admits the "ultimate
end" is the unionization of the shop then it must conclude that
anything other than that is an incident and a means to effect
that end. In determining that the interference with interstate
commerce involved is the "direct object," and is therefore illegal,
the court seems to be entirely neglectful of the "reasonable test."
It is this test to which Mr. Justice Brandeis refers when he
15 The Federal courts have in many cases seemed to investigate fully the
facts of the restraint as the basis for determining whether it was "unrea-
sonable." United States v. Terminal Ass'n, infra note 17 (court we nt into
the unusual geographical position of St. Louis); Continental Candy Corp.
v. California & Hawaian Sugar Co., infra note 17; Fosburgh v. California
& Hawaian Sugar Co., iinfra note 17. In the latter two cases the court
took into account post war conditions as factors in determining the unrca-
sonableness of the restraint. In United States v. Fur Drc-sers & Dyrs
Ass'n, infra note 16, the court discusses unusual conditions in the fur in-
dustry, including enormous number of insolvencies, smallness of individual
claims with accompanying difficulties of collection, and prosperity of mer-
chants in the industry.
16 Compare the facts in cases where interference in interstate commerce
was held to be incidental, and so not within the law. In Anderson v. United
States, svpra note 6, the defendant, a live stock exchange, boycotted any
commission firms who sold cattle to traders and speculators on the market
not members of the exchange. It was held that the defendants were not
liable under the Sherman Law since (1) mere refusal to do business is not
sufficient, (2) no feature of monopoly existed since any yard trader might
join exchange, and (3) where the subject matter of the agreement whose
purpose is to regulate rather than destroy business does not directly act on
interstate commerce, it is not within the act, if well calculated to attain such
purposes. In Arkansas Brokerage Co. v. Dunn & Powell, 173 Fed. 899 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1909), it was held that if the new expedient (forming of sub-
sidiary corporation to promote economy in management of existing businez3
by jobbers of Pine Bluff) affected interstate commerce at all, it was not in
that direct, immediate, or necessary way, which alone would make it ob-
noxious to the laws, but only in an indirect, incidental, and unimportant
way not within the denunciation of the law. In Konecky v. Jewish Press,
288 Fed. 179 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923), a conspiracy to injure the editor of a
newspaper, circulated in several slates, in various ways including boycott
on subscribers was held not within the law, since "the conspiracy condemned
by the Sherman Act is one the direct intent and effect of which is a restraint
upon interstate commerce and not one where the effect is incidental."
It is interesting to note that these Federal cases are all combinations or
conspiracies executed by entrepreneurs rather than by groups of organized
labor. But see United States v. Fur Dressers Ass'n, 5 F. (2d) 869 (S. D.
N. Y. 1925).
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says in the dissenting opinion: "only unreasonable restraints are
prohibited by the Sherman Law." 17
From a survey of the cases cited and the problems involved,
two outstanding points emerge clearly. The United States Su-
preme Court has already in labor cases used "direct interference"
17 That "only unreasonable restraints are prohibited by the Sherman
law" seems to have been achieved by an evolutionary development. Recent
cases have stressed this point of view to the exclusion of any other. Con-
tinental Candy Corp. v. California & Hawaian Sugar Co., 270 Fed. 302 (N.
D. Cal. 1920); Fosburgh v. California & Hawaian Sugar Co., 291 Fed. 29
(C. C. A. 9th, 1923); U. S. v. Fur Dressers & Dyers Ass'n, supra note 10;
see United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 180, 31 Sup. Ct,
632, 648 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 60, 31 Sup.
Ct. 502, 515 (1911) ("... the provisions (Sherman Law, §§ 1, 2) necessarily
called for the exercise of judgment which required that some standard
should be resorted to for the purpose of determining whether the prohibi-
tions contained in the statute had or had not in any given case been vio-
lated. Thus not specifying but indubitably contemplating and requiring a
standard, it follows that it was intended that the standard of reason which
has been applied at common law and in this country in dealing with sub-
jects of the character embraced by the statute was intended to be the mea-
sure.") Compare the strong dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan in Board of
Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 38 Sup. Ct. 242 (1918).
There the Chicago Board was the commercial centre of trading in grain.
It adopted the "Call Rule" by which members were prohibited from pur-
chasing grain between sessions at any price other than that of the closing
bid. It was held that in view of the history and purposes of the rule it was
a reasonable regulation of business and so consistent with the Anti-Trust
Law. In United States v. Terminal Association, 224 U. S. 383, 32 Sup. Ct.
507 (1912), the test of reason is assumed, and in United States v. Reading
Co., 226 U. S. 324, 369, 370, 33 Sup. Ct. 90, 103 (1912), it is spoken of as
secured by a long line of decisions. In United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 377 (1927), the court cites "the rule laid
down by the opinions of this court in the Standard Oil and Tobacco cases"
as being that "only those restraints upon interstate commerce which are
unreasonable are prohobited by the Sherman Law."
In order to appreciate the evolutionary development it is necessary to
look at some of the older cases. In United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight
Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290, 17 Sup. Ct. 540 (1897), an agreement between certain
railroads for maintaining and regulating freight rates was held within the
Act. The court said: "When, therefore, the body of an act pronounces as
illegal every contract or combination in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states, etc., the plain and ordinary meaning of such
language is not limited to that kind of contract alone which is in unreason-
able restraint of trade, but all contracts are included in such language, and
no exception or limitation can be added without placing in the act that which
has been omitted by Congress." Supra at 328, 17 Sup. Ct. at 554. In
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 331, 24 Sup. Ct.
436, 454 (1904), where a combination of two competing interstate railroads
to form a holding corporation as an instrument through which they should
be consolidated in effect, and so destroying competition was held to violate
the Anti-Trust Act, it was said: ". . . the act is not limited to restraints
, * , that are unreasonable in their nature, but embraces all direct re-
straints."
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as (1) a sympathetic strike on a railroad,21 (2) a boycott on goods
entering interstate commerce, where there is an appeal to such
"outside" groups by the trade union as the whole American
Federation of Labor, 9 (3) a boycott on goods entering interstate
commerce where accompanied by acts of coercion and an appeal
to third parties, 29 and (4) a boycott on "unfair material," of
which a large proportion will go into interstate conunerce, by a
single union throughout the country, in the absence of either
coercion or an appeal to third parties.1 The first point then is
that such terms as "direct object," "sole purpose," and "ultimate
end" are in themselves of no avail in determining a case, for they
cannot be used as a standard for determining the "reason-
ableness" or "unreasonableness" of a restraint on any new set of
facts. Thus it follows that the court, in order to determine the
existance or absence of reasonableness and justification, must
first familiarize itself with all the social and economic facts avail-
able, which bear on the particular aspect of the bargaining
struggle involved in the case before it.
The second point to be noted is a corollary to the first, namely,
the need for accurate material as to the widely varied forms of
trade union organization, data on working conditions, product-
ivity, and the relations to these problems of the trade union in-
volved in any particular suit.
The stonecutters' union is a comparatively old union which has
been affiliated with the American Federation of Labor since
1907. In 1923 81% of the total membership of American unions
was affiliated with the Federation.2- The members of this larger
body are "organized into local trade unions, national trade unions,
city federations, a national federation, local trade councils, and
national trade councils. The same unionist may be included in
all of these six forms of grouping." 23 It is for this reason difficult
to conceive of the bargaining struggle in purely local terms, and
especially so since the craft union has been yielding its place of
supremacy to the national industrial union.24
:18 Toledo Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730 (N. D. Ohio, 1893).
'9 Loewe v. Laylor, supra note 13.
20 Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, supra note 13.
21 Instant case.
=
2 WoLuIAN, GROWTH OF AismERICAN TRADE UNIONS 1880-1923 (1924). Sta-
tistics about membership in the Stonecutters' Union are alEo taken from
this source.
23Barnett, The Dominance of the National Union in American Labor
Organization (1913) 27 QUAR. J. OF Ec. 455.
24 Glocker, Ainalgamnation of Related Trades (1915) 5 A:,i.T Ec. l'uv.
554: ". . . a gradual evolution has been talking place in consequences of
-which craft unions are disappearing. Of 133 national unions, most of them
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, only 23 may be called
craft unions; if by craft we mean Work requiring identical skill and train-
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The industry of stonecutting is declining because of the in-
creasing use of artificial substitutes. According to the 1910
census report there were 37,731 stonecutters while according
to the 1920 census there were only 22,099, a decrease of
over 33%. Such a considerable displacement of skilled labor must
inevitably lead to industrial unrest, unless it is so guided as to
cause a minimum of hardship to the workers, who are thus forced
into other industries. The affiliation of a national union with
the American Federation of Labor, which includes allied trades,
might well be used to help solve such a problem.
In 1897 the membership of the Stonecutters' was 6,000; this
grew rather steadily until 1912 when it had reached 8,900. Since
that time, however, it has declined, and in 1921, when the original
disagreement leading to this suit took place, its membership was
4,000.25 The union is an international organization and so of
this number only 3,200 worked in the United States. These con-
stitute 14% of the stonecutters in the country. It is from the
activity of this group, as a maximum, that the court sought to
protect interstate commerce.
In studying the facts of this case, it seems worth noting that
the original dispute took place in 1921, a time of a grave in-
dustrial depression, during the first great break in union mem-
bership since the middle nineties, 26 and shortly after the in-
auguration of the "open shop" drive.
Professor Commons of Wisconsin in his introduction to Trade
Unionism and Labor Problems (1921) states his belief that in-
dustrial peace can come only when employers or entrepreneurs
recognize the necessity of assuring laborers as well as investors
security for their contribution to the industry. Fitch speaks 2-
of the wage earner as a victim of economic insecurity and of the
labor struggle to a large extent as a groping about for certainty
of income. He also speaks of all the things which make work
impossible, whether inability to find a job, or inability to perform
labor 'on account of accident, illness, or old age as industrial
hazards which have become factors in the wage earner's feeling
of insecurity and add to the causes of industrial unrest. Where
such security is lacking workers must combine; in the United
States the state does not assure the workers the minimum as-
sured to the workers of England through compulsory health in-
ing. .. The amalgamation of related trades has been taking place in the
United States almost ever since national unions began to appear."
25 The decisions cite the membership of the union as 5000 but according
to Mr. Wolman, the membership at the time of the original dispute, 1921,
was 4000, although it has increased since that time.
20 WOLAIAN, op. cit. supra note 22, at 21.
27 Fitch, op. cit. supra note 10, at 5.
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surance and compulsory unemployment insurance.-  State
attempts at fixing a minimum wage have been held unconstitu-
tional. Various attempts at federal child labor measures have
failed. Real organization of the labor market is almost unknown
in this country. Trade agreements (usually acleved through
collective bargaining) and collective bargaining with the strike
as an ultimate resort, with the exception of political action, are
the only means which can be effectively used to assure some
security to wage-earners in the United States. While trade
agreements have in many cases proved exceedingly beneficial in
the interests of both sound working conditions and industrial
peace, they are limited in number. The existence of a trade
agreement implies on the part of the employer an acceptance of
collective bargaining. The defendant union has such agree-
ments, which are usually short, providing primarily for a method
of arbitration, a closed shop, and a 44 hour week.-- Where, how-
ever, employers refuse to recognize collective bargaining and re-
28 Article by Halsey on Compulsory Health Insurance in Great Britain,
in CoMMoNs, TRADE UNIoNIsM AND LABOR PROBLuMS (1921) 45.
29 Halsey, British Unemployment Laws, supra note 28, at 56.
So U. S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS (1926) Bull. No. 419. (Trade Agree-
ments in 1925.) "Extracts from the agreement between the Minneapolis
and St. Paul Cut Stone Contractors and the Twin City Local, effective for
three years from April 1, 1925, follow:
1. It is agreed and understood that the party of the first part will
employ as stonecutters for pneumatic tool and hand cutting members of
the local of Journeymen Stonecutters, provided, however, said local of
journeymen stonecutters shall at all times furnish and provide such num-
ber of skilled workmen as shall be required by the party of the first part.
Any failure on the part of the said local of journeymen stonecutters to
provide sufficient skilled men after one week's notice shall confer the right
to the party of the first part to employ stonecutters as they see fit, and
such men shall at once make application and be permitted to join said local
of journeymen stonecutters as provided for similar cases.
2. Eight hours shall constitute a day's work. Four hours Saturday. In
case of emergency stonecutters will be allowed to work overtime at the
rate of time and one half for first two hours; after first two hours double
time. Under no circumstances will Saturday afternoon work be allowed.
3. The foreman shall be selected by and be the agent of the employer.
He need not be a practical stonecuter, but if he is employed to cut stone
he must be a member of said local, but may not attend meetings of the
local.
4. One apprentice for five or less journeymen employed. Two appren-
tices to six or more journeymen employed. Apprentices to serve four year
in full at stonecutting, and when hired must be between the ages of 1G and
20 years.
5. The party of the first part shall have the right to install the air
hammer for use on such work as in its judgment said hammer is required.
14. It is understood and agreed that the parties hereto will arbitrate all
differences or grievances that may arise between them during the life of this
agreement without any strike upon the part of the party of the second part
or lockout upon the party of the first part under the following rules: Each
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fuse to employ members of the outstanding trade union in the
trade, the union is presented with a troublesome situation. From
long experience it has learned that non-union-usually lower-
standards in any district will tend to destroy union conditions
everywhere, since otherwise the union employers are placed at a
disadvantage when in competition with non-union employers.
The conditions existing throughout the trade are therefore the
business of the trade union. Where the goods of the employer
as in the instant case are destined for interstate commerce, a
difficult problem is presented to the union. If its standards are
to be protected, the non-union field must be organized. Still it
cannot appeal to railroad employees to boycott its goods; 31 it
cannot by means of a picket of the employer's shop and an ap-
peal to members of the American Federation of Labor with which
it is affiliated, boycott the employer's goods or, in any way, use
coercion or intimidation to the detriment of the employer.," The
strongest measure it can adopt, then, if it is to be at all effective is
to tell its members to refuse to work on goods produced under non-
union conditions. This the defendant in the instant case did. It
did nothing more; it did not picket, use coercive measures of any
kind, or induce or attempt to induce others to boycott the peti-
tioners. Still its activity has been enjoined as a violation of the
Sherman Law. It is difficult to see how in the future the national
trade unions can protect the standards they have achieved
against regional attacks which organized groups of employers
can successfully wage.
INJUNCTION-NUISANCE---BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE
In a recent federal decision,1 the court supported and applied
the doctrine of the balance of convenience. The lower court
granted an injunction restraining the defendant, owner of a stone
crushing mill, from polluting with slate dust a stream running
through the plaintiff's farm, from similarly polluting the air, and
from jarring his dwelling house by blasting. Plaintiff also re-
ceived judgment for ten thousand dollars for past damages. On
appeal, the decree was modified. The absolute injunction against
polluting the stream was to stand (such pollution being prevent-
able) ; the blasting was to be reduced so as not to unreasonably
jar the plaintiff's house; and although the injunction against
party hereto shall elect an arbitration committee of three members, to whom
all contention shall be submitted. Upon their failure to agree and adjust
the matter under consideration they shall, by agreement, select an umpire
(who shall in no wise be affiliated with this trade), whose decision shall be
final and binding on both parties."
31 Toledo Ry. Co. v. Pa. Co., supra note 18.
32 Loewe v. Lawlor, supra note 13; cf. Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering,
supra note 13.
1 Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F. (2d) 736 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
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polluting the air was to stand, defendant was given leave to
continue operation on showing that the dust arrestors which he
had been using and which were 99 percent efficient, were the best
obtainable and ran at a maximum efficiency. The damages were
reduced to thirty-five hundred dollars. Judge Learned Hand,
holding that there was no settled law in Vermont to bind the
court, admitted the violation of a legal right, but considered the
situation as requiring "a quantitative compromise between two
conflicting interests," to be settled by balancing the conveniences.
In refusing to uphold the absolute injunction, Judge Hand pointed
out that a rule requiring its issuance would be unreasonable and
harsh, and permit extortionate claims. The defendant's plant
was worth a million dollars, the complainant's farm about fifteen
thousand. An absolute injunction would virtually close the
former's plant, resulting in injury out of all proportion to the
benefit the complainant would derive therefrom.
The cases involving the question of the balancing of conveni-
ences in suits to enjoin nuisances 2 are in great confusion," even
within single jurisdictions. 4  The reason for this confusion is
2 The granting of preliminary injunctions is clearly discretionary. Sellers
v. Parvis and W. Co., 30 Fed. 164 (D. Del. 1886); See Evans v. reading
Chemical Fertilizing Co., 160 Pa. 209, 224, 28 Atl. 702, 709 (1894); United
States v. Luce, 141 Fed. 385, 416 (D. Del. 1905) ; 4 PomEaoy, EQuiTy JUvis-
PRUDENCE, (2d ed. 1919) § 1685.
3 Balance of convenience applied: Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105 (1868);
Huckenstine's Appeal, 70 Pa. 102 (1871); Fox v. Holcomb, 32 Mich. 494
(1875); Clifton Iron Co. v. Dye, 87 Ala. 468, 6 So. 192 (188S); Simmons v.
Mayor of Paterson, 60 N. J. Eq. 385, 45 Atl. 995 (1900) ; Mountain Copper
Co. v. United States, 142 Fed. 625 (C. C. A. 9th, 190G); McCarthy v.
Bunker Hill Mining Co., 147 Fed. 981 (D. Idaho, 190G), apfd, 104 Fed. 927
(C. C. A. 9th, 1908), certiorari denied, 212 U. S. 583 (1908); Bliss v.
Anaconda Copper Co., 167 Fed. 342 (D. Mont. 1909), amfd, as Blis3 v.
Washoe Copper Co., 186 Fed. 789 (C. C. A. 9th, 1911), certiorari denied, 231
U. S. 764 (1913); Booth-Kelly Lumber Co. v. Eugene, 67 Or. 381, 136 Pac.
29 (1913); Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S. W.
658 (1904); Elliot Nursery Co. v. DuQuesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 160, 126
Atl. 345 (1924). Contra: Broadbent v. Imperial Gas Co., 7 De G. At. & G.
436 (1857), af'd 7 H. C. L. 600 (1859); Woodruf! v. North Bloomfield
Gravel Mining Co., 18 Fed. 753 (D. Cal. 1881); Campbell v. Seaman, 63
N. Y. 568 (1876); Hennessy v. Carmony, 50 N. J. Eq. 616, 25 Atl. 374
(1892); Sullivan v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540, 57 Atl. 1065
(1904) (strong dissenting opinions); United States v. Luce, -upra note 2;
American Smelting and Refining Co. v. Godfrey, 158 Fed. 225 (C. C. A. 8th,
1907). It is submitted that McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Min. Co., 140
Fed. 951 (D. Utah, 1904), is not good authority, as the injunction was con-
ditional on defendants non-payment of assessed compensatory damages.
For a note criticizing the doctrine see (1922) 36 HRv. L. RE%. 211.
4 In Pennsylvania, the balance of convenience was declared decisive in
Richard's Appeal, supra note 3, Huckenstine's Appeal, sipra note ', and
Dilworth's Appeal, 91 Pa. 247 (1879). In Pa. Lead Co.s Appeal, 9G Pa. 11g
(1880), the doctrine was repudiated, but strong dicta in Robb v. Carnegie,
145 Pa. 324, 22 AtI. 649 (1891), supports Richard's Appeal, -vpra note 3.
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apparent. Although the skeleton situations in all these cases are
similar, the many elements involved allow great latitude of differ-
entiation. The variations in the proportionate values of the con-
flicting interests-a matter of degree-are, of course, the princi-
pal determinative factor. Such elements as the amount of injury,'
acquiescence,6 fraud,7 wantoness of the act,8 attempts to rectify
the injury," the effect of the decree on the parties, and on labor,
In Walters v. McElroy, 151 Pa. 549, 25 Atl. 125 (1892), Evans v. Reading
Chemical Fertilizing Co., supra note 2, and Sullivan v. Jones and Laughlin
Steel Co., supra note 3, the doctrine was again repudiated. Yet in 1924 in
Elliot Nursery Co. v. DuQuesne Light Co., supra note 3, the court balanced
conveniences and refused to enjoin an electric light plant from damaging a
nursery, relying on the earlier decisions. The supreme court frequently
distinguished the cases on tenuous fact differences, and thus were enabled
to decide each case without strict adherence to precedent.
Although the weight of authority in New York is probably against the
balance of convenience doctrine, the courts refuse to lay down a strict
rule to that effect. Campbell v. Seaman, supra note 3; Strobel v. Kerr Salt
Co., 164 N. Y. 303, 58 N. E. 142 (1900) ; Whalen v. Union Bag and Paper
Co., 208 N. Y. 1, 101 N. E. 805 (1913); of. McCann v. Chasm Power Co.,
211 N. Y. 301, 105 N. E. 416 (1914).
The Federal courts seem to have adopted the flexible standard, Mountain
Copper Co. v. United States, supra note 3; McCarthy v. Bunker Hill Mining
Co., supra note 3; Bliss v, Anaconda Copper Co., supra note 3. Contra:
American Smelting and Refining Co. v. Godfrey, supra note 3.
5 In American Smelting and Refining Co. v. Godfrey, supra note 3, fumes
were injurious to property, vegetation and physical health, while in Moun-
tain Copper Co. v. United States, supra note 3, the fumes were cast over
waste land of little value. However, where there is only the violation of a
trivial, technical right of slight value, an injunction will not be granted.
Bentley v. Empire Portland Cement Co., 48 Misc. 457, 96 N. Y. Supp. 831
(Sup. Ct. 1905); McCann v. Chasm Power Co., supra note 4.
G Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Min. Co., supra note 3; Herr v.
Central Kentucky Lunatic Asylum, 110 Ky. 282, 61 S. W. 283 (1901); New
York City v. Pine, 185 U. S. 93, 22 Sup. Ct. 592 (1902) ; McCleery v. High-
land Bay Gold Mining Co., supra note 3.
7 Edwards v. Allouez Mining Co., 38 Mich. 46 (1878). Landowners in
the vicinity of large plants may collect large sums from operators desirous
of avoiding litigation. Cf. Bliss v. Anaconda Copper Co., supra note 3. The
practice of "buying off" has at times lead to great difficulty, by encouraging
such claims. See The History and Legal Phases of the Smoke Problem
(1918) 58 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF MINING ENxaINEERS
198, 202.8 Herr v. Central Kentucky Lunatic Asylum, supra note 6. This element
is more apparent in suits to enjoin continuing trespasses. Cf. Mobile and
Ohio R. R. Co. v. Zimmerman, 206 Ala. 37, 89 So. 475 (1921), (1922) 31
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Bliss v. Anaconda Copper Co., supra note 3; McCarthy v. Bunker Hill
Mining Co. supra note 3. An argument favorable to adherents of the uncon-
ditional injunction may be drawn from the case of Madison et al. v. Duck-
town Copper Co., supra note 3. The court balanced equities and refused
an injunction, stating that in its opinion an injunction would result in
cessation of operations and great loss to the state and public. But the case
came up again in the Supreme Court with the State of Georgia as complain-
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towns, and industry in general, 0 may be inextricably mixed, and
afford grounds for distinguishing fact situations. Although
courts frequently declare unequivocally either for or against the
balancing of conveniences, such statements, taken in the light
of surrounding circumstances and the actual decisions, are often
disregarded as being mere dicta." The result is a weakening of
precedent, and where conveniences are balanced, the decision is
based chiefly on the exercise of discretion.
Whether an injunction should be issued with or without con-
ditions is a much controverted question. The question is usually
stated as whether an injunction is discretionary or issues as of
right. It is submitted that "discretionary" and "right," as used
here, have no definite connotation and therefore only cloud the
issue.1 2 In certain cases the courts, holding that an injunction
issues as "of right," grant a conditional injunction. Inasmuch as
an injunction conditional on non-payment of damages, for in-
stance, is, in effect, no injunction at all, such action seems to
practically nullify the popular term "of right." 13 In the instant
case the court speaks of the injunction as going cx debito justi-
tiae, and being discretionary. This seems to be a novel and sound
view. The courts are not free to act capriciously, nor are they
bound, in the absence of precedent, to issue an unconditional in-
junction where it appears most expedient to refuse or modify it.
It is submitted that a correlation of means to ends, a reasonable
compromise as in the instant case, is neither too flexible nor too
ant, and the injunction was granted. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 20G U. S.
230, 27 Sup. Ct. 618 (1907). Yet the company continued operations, and
greatly reduced the injury by the use of new methods, which resulted in a
valuable by-product. It should be noted, however, that the injury was not
entirely abolished, and the company paid considerable sums to neighboring
farmers subsequent to the decree. BULLETIN 84, Bureau oF I E3 83--S4
(1915).
10 The effect on the public, particularly the inhabitants of the region in
which the offending plant is situated, is stressed in Bliss v. Anaconda Copper
Co., supra note 3, and McCarthy v. Bunker Hill Mining Co., supra note 3.
That the injunction will directly aid a private party is conceded, but the
effect on the laborers and other defendants should not be overlookted.
1 The lack of uniformity in the Pennsylvania cases, mpra note 4, illus-
trates this point. See 5 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 43G4: "Cases
can be found which, not including the elements making necessary carefully
qualified statements, contain broad dicta that the balance of injury ill
or will not be considered."
12 The court in Hennessy v. Carmony, supra note 3, referred to two vari-
ant notions: first, that the judge should be discreet and discriminating,
giving due weight to each circumstance, as he should do in every case;
second, action relying on discretion without regard for equitable
or legal rules. The latter view of discretion is justly criticized. It is sub-
mitted that the first definition is consistent with that discretion exercised in
balancing conveniences, although the court entertained a different view.
:L3 In MlcCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., sapra note 3, such an
injunction was granted although the court considered the injunction as a
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narrow. That legislatures should make laws and that courts should
apply them seems axiomatic, but it is well known that "judicial
legislation" is an active, potent, and not undesirable lawmaker. 14
Indeed, it is difficult to perceive how the cases under discussion,
with their complex components, can be solved without a con-
siderable exercise of discretion. This discretion is often decisive
in suits for injunctions for specific performance ' and continuing
trespasses, 16 where conveniences are balanced.
This doctrine has been severely criticized. It is said to threaten
the rights of the poor while furthering the interest of the rich,1
to amount to appropriation of property for private purposes,, to
make predictability impossible and to give an undesirable amount
of freedom to the courts. 9 In many cases large groups of labor
and whole towns are dependent upon and allied with a large in-
dustry. The interests of these people are of prime public and
economic importance. To enjoin the industry in such cases would
detrimentally affect the interests of "the poor" at least as much
as a refusal to enjoin.20 Furthermore, there is always the possi-
bility of compensatory damages in equity,2 and, technically, there
is a remedy at law. The complainant's injury may be mitigated
by a judiciously composed decree, 22 or the injunction at least may
be made conditional on defendant's failure to use every possible
means to mitigate the damage.23 In theory, predictability would
be improved by a rule requiring the issuance of injunctions, but
the argument has little validity. The narrow rule savors too
much of what Judge Cardozo calls "the passion for elegantia
juris," 24 and Judge Hand in the instant case refers to as an
"apocryphal consistency." Furthermore, the numerous variable
matter of right. Although the reason given for such proceeding was laches
on the part of the complainant, the case aptly illustrates a method of avoid-
ing the absolute and unconditional injunction.
14 CARDOZo, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1925) 10-11.
'r, Herzog v. Atchinson, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 153 Cal. 496, 95 Pac.
898 (1908) ; J. A. Migel v. Bachofern, 96 N. J. Eq. 608, 126 Atl. 396 (1924) ;
Nat. Cash Register Co. v. Remington Arms Co., 212 App. Div. 343, 209 N. Y.
Supp. 40 (1st Dept, 1905), Tev'g. 122 Misc. 233, 202 N. Y. Supp. 691 (Sup.
Ct. 1904) ; 5 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 795, 796.
16 Robb v. Carnegie, supra note 4; Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 262, 215 Pac.
534 (1923).
17 Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., supra note 3.
is McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., supra note 3.
'9 See (1922) 36 HARV. L. REV. 211, 215.
20 The presence of an individual who will be affected directly by the decree
veils the interest of the public in the individual's plant. In police power
cases the public interest, not being so veiled, is more readily cognizable.
21 Edwards v. Allouez Mining Co., supra note 7; Bliss v. Anaconda Copper
Co., supra note 3; McCarthy v. Bunker Hill Min. Co., supra note 3; Mc-
Cleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., supra note 3.
22 Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, supra note 3; United States v. Luce,
supra note 2. The instant case is a good illustration.
23 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., supra note 9.
24 CARDOZO, op. cit. supra note 14, at 34.
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elements in each case furnish avenues of escape, and the narrow
rule would leave the courts with the same exercise of free decision
that is attacked. For, as the equities are balanced in determining
the very existence of a nuisance,2 5 and as the length of time
constituting laches is a matter for individual judgment in each
case, the way is clear to avoid harsh rules. A vexatious question
regarding the injury by blasting where no substance is thrown
upon the complainant's land, might well rise in an action at
law on the facts of the instant case.20 Since the term nuisance
has no definite connotation, '27 the mental process of the court in
determining its existence must, in the absence or confusion of
precedents, be much the same as in determining whether an in-
junction should issue. The very interest to be protected, a "valu-
able legal right," as it is commonly called, is a term of no definite
content-a variable, especially in relation to nuisancesY2 A rule
requiring an unconditional injunction in all cases of nuisance
would therefore be easily avoided by refusing to find a nuisance.
It is, then, questionable whether the narrow rule would be effec-
tive, regardless of its still more questionable advisibility,. Legis-
lation granting power to balance conveniences would be merely a
formalistic grant to the courts to do exactly what they are and
have been doing for years in specific cases. A narrow statute
would not work justice, a broad one would not disturb the status
quo. A statute permitting the exercise of eminent domain would
be of doubtful constitutionality.2 Furthermore, it could not
regulate the elements requiring equitable consideration beyond
requiring the exercise to be reasonable,20 and the courts would
still have the ultimate decision as to what was reasonable. A
rule requiring an unconditional injunction in nuisance cases
would lead to great hardship,31 extortionate claims, 2 and eco-
nomic waste.
2 See Jeremiah Smith, Reasonable Use of One's Own Property as a Justi-
fication for Damage to a Neighbor (1917) 17 COL. L. lc~v. 333.
26 See Jeremiah Smith, Liability for Substantial Physical Damages to
Land by Blasting (1919) 33 HAm'. L. REv. 542, 007.
27 Jeremiah Smith, op. cit. supra note 25, at 389. The maxim sic utcre tuo
ut alienum. non laedas, so frequently quoted in cases supporting the absolute
injunction, is attacked as "mere verbiage."
28 See comment (1924) 34 YAIE LAW JOURNAL 303.
29 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DoAN (2d ed. 1917) §§ 52, 79.
3o Reasonableness is the ultimate standard in eminent domain and in
police power. 1 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 29, §§ 52, 99; FnsUN'r, POLICE;
PowEa (1904) 5.
31 In Attorney-General v. Council of Birmingham, 4 Kay. & J. 528 (1858),
the court said: "It is a matter of almost absolute indifference whether the
decision will affect a population of 250,000." Such statements are not in-
frequent. In his LAw OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS (1912) 35, Black makes this
cogent statement, "But still the system of chancery jurisprudence has not
crystallized into an irrefragable set of formal rules, to the exclusion of the
ethical principle on which it was founded."
32Supra note 7.
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RESPONSIBILITY OF AN INDORSER ON A NON-NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENT
The courts to whom the problem of the responsibility of an
indorser on a non-negotiable instrument 1 is presented, draw at-
tention to the hopeless conflict in the decisions.2 In so far as
this is an actuality it is unfortunate, as certainty in the case
of any instrument used in commerce, whether negotiable or
non-negotiable, is an element of prime importance, and, if em-
ployed in transactions crossing state lines, uniformity of deci-
sion would seem to be equally important. But the extent to
which non-negotiable instruments are used in this sense, as a
convenient business device, is open to some question.3 It is of
course obvious at the same time that any widespread use of
non-negotiable instruments must to some extent await definite
statement of their legal status, and in particular an agreement
as to the responsibility of the indorser.
If we examine the cases of the last century, we find that all
is confusion, but it is believed that this confusion in many cases
merely reflected the chaos in the decisons regarding indorse-
ments on negotiable instruments prior to the enactment of the
Negotiable Instruments Law.4 It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that most of the older cases attached responsibility to the
indorser on a non-negotiable instrument, one of the principal
questions litigated being as to whether the indorser was entitled
to notice of dishonor. The indorser was held to be a surety
to the maker, or more strictly, a guarantor of collection, as re-
'The term "non-negotiable instruments" as here used refers to written
promises to pay money which fail to meet the tests of negotiability
prescribed by the Negotiable Instruments Law. Most of the litigation as
to the indorser's responsibility has been with regard to indorsements on
instruments in form similar to notes, rather than bills of exchange, and
this article will be so limited. It is recognized, at the outset, however, that
the boundaries of the "non-negotiable note" class, if it may be regarded as
a separate class, have not been definitely located. For a general treatment
of this question, see Goodrich, Non-Negotiable Bills and Notes (1920) 5
IoWA L. BuLL. 65. Also see (1926) 24 MICH. L. REV. 606.
2 See Johnson v. Lassiter, 165 N. C. 47, 51, 71 S. E. 23, 25 (1911).
3 In a great many of the cases in which such instruments have figured,
the point at issue has been whether the instrument could be held negotiable
in form, showing little evidence of intention on the part of anyone to use
the instrument in its character as non-negotiable paper. On the other
hand, in many cases paper more or less frankly non-negotiable in form
is issued in daily recurring situations, as for example, non-negotiable cer-
tificates of deposit issued by banks, or the large number of collateral form
notes employed notwithstanding they may fail to meet the formal requisites
of negotiability. While the needs of the immediate parties will account for
the issuance of such instruments, their value to the community at large
depends, in part at least, on the legal effect to be given to their indorsement.
4In particular the variety of opinion as to the effect of an irregular in-
dorsement. See Castle v. Candee, 16 Conn. 223, 233 (1844).
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sponsibility attached only if the principal debtor had been pur-
sued with due diligence.3 He was also held to the same respon-
sibility as a drawer or indorser of a negotiable instrument, the
ancient theory obtaining with regard to negotiable instruments,
that the indorser is drawer of a new bill on the maker, being
invoked.6 In at least one case his obligation has been viewed as
being that of the maker of a new promisory note for the sum
appearing on the face of the original instrument7 These are
involved methods of reaching the result desired by the court."
The New York and Massachusetts courts appear to have fol-
lowed a strange doctrine. The courts declared that the holder
of a non-negotiable instrument transferred by a blanh indorse-
ment may write over the indorsement a promise in the form
of a promisory note." The result reached is the same as that
reached by the cases indulging the theory that such an indorse-
ment is the execution of a new promisory note,10 and the effect
is that the obligation of an indorser on a non-negotiable instru-
ment is, at least with regard to the requirement of notice of
dishonor, greater than that of an indorser of a negotiable instru-
ment. 1  There appear to be no recent cases in Massachusetts or
New York on the point and it is difficult to predict what would
be held today.
The more recent decisions appear to have gone to the opposite
extreme and have refused to attach responsibility to the indorser
of a non-negotiable instrument 1- unless an intent can be found
from the form of his indorsement to bind himself in some capac-
r Castle v. Candee, si:pra note 4; Nichols' Executor v. Porter, 2 W. Va.
13 (1867).
rAldis v. Johnson, 1 Vt. 136 (1828).
7Long v. Symser & Hawthorne, 3 Iowa 260 (185G). See Seymour v. Slych,
8 Wend. 403, 421 (N. Y. 1832).
8 For a criticism of these theories together with annotations of the older
cases, see 1 HARE AND WALLACE, AmEimcAN, LRADXG CAScS (18,17) 177.
9 Cromwell v. Hewitt, 40 N. Y. 491 (1869) (court alzo gave the holder
an option to write an absolute guaranty of payment into the indorzemcnt);
Sweetser v. French, 13 Mletc. 262 (Mass. 1847). In the latter case the
court cited as authority the case of Union Ban]: v. Willis, 8 Mlet. 501
(Mlass. 1844), holding an accommodation indorser on a -cgoti ble instrumcnt
to the responsibility of a maker of a promissory note. The generality
of these decisions, however, may very well be limited by a consideration of
the fact situation before the court. In Cromwell v. Hewitt, a:pra, the in-
dorser had assured the plaintiff at the time of the transfer that he would be
responsible although the measure of his responsibility was not fixed. In
Sweetser v. French, supra, the indorser was an accommodation payee.
10 Supra note 7.
11 See § 66, N. I. L.
- Smith Sons Gin & Mlach. Co. v. Badham, S1 S. C. 63, 61 S. E. 103
(1908); Newer v. First Nat. Bank, 74 Mont. 549, 241 Pac. 613 (1925);
Bright v. Offield, 81 Wash. 442, 143 Pac. 159 (1914).
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ity.123 In a suit against such an indorser, the courts label the
defendant an assignor of a contract chose in action and respon-
sible, if at all, in the absence of an intent to the contrary, upon
implied warranties.1 There are still, however, many cases hav-
ing to do with very similar fact situations which reach contrary
results. 5 Many other cases "1 reaching contrary results are gov-
erned by statutes imposing an obligation in some form or other
upon indorsers of non-negotiable instruments."
It is believed that the Negotiable Instruments Law has indi-
rectly influenced the departure from the rules of the older cases
which attached responsibility to these indorsers. 18 This results
partly from the fact that the N. I. L. tends to separate negotiable
instruments from all others with somewhat greater distinctness
than formerly, thus in a measure tending to group non-negotiable
instruments with ordinary contracts, and it is but a step from
this for a court to hold that the statute denies to all such instru-
13 Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Chapline, 109 Ark. 242, 158 S. W. 151 (1913);
McEwen v. Black, 44 Okla. 644 146 Pac. 37 (1915).
1- See Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Spates, 41 W. Va. 27, 30, 23 S. E. 681,
682 (1895); South Bend Iron Works v. Paddock, 37 Kan. 510, 514, 15 Pac.
574, 576 (1887). Even in the matter of warranties, however, there does
not seem to be agreement. In Merchants Bank v. Spates, supra, the court
said there was a warranty of (1) validity, (2) ability to transfer, (3)
a subsisting unpaid obligation of the maker and (4) the solvency of the
debtor. This last makes the obligation practically equivalent to a guaranty
of collection. In the South Bend Iron Works case the court stated that the
transferor guaranties the genuineness of the instrument and that it is what
it purports to be on is face but nothing more.
'5 Duchaine v. Phoenix, 135 Atl. 715 (Vt. 1927); Newland v. Moore, 173
N. C. 728, 92 S. E. 367 (1917); Johnson v. Lassiter, supra note 2. In the
Vermont case the court ruled that a transferor of a non-negotiable instru-
ment, not an accommodation party, was to be deemed prima facie a maker
not entitled to presentment and notice of dishonor.
16 Bank of Luverne v. Sharpe, 152 Ala. 589, 44 So. 871 (1907); Berry
v. Grove, 192 Iowa 300, 184 N. W. 661 (1921); Kampmann v. Williams,
70 Tex. 568, 8 S. W. 310 (1888).
"7 Ala. Civ. Code (1923) §§ 9226, 9227, 9228; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
1926) § 11345; Tex. Ann. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1914) art. 584, 585, 586; W.
Va. Code Ann. (Barnes, 1923) c. 99, § 15; Iowa Code (1927) § 9456; Conn.
Gen. Stat. (1918) § 4550.
Of the above, the statutes of Alabama, Indiana, and Texas attach respon-
sibility to the indorser only if the maker has been pursued with due dili-
gence. The Iowa Code provides that "the assignor (of a non-negotiable
instrument) shall be liable to the action of his assignee without notice."
The Connecticut statute provides that "the blank indorsement of a non-
negotiable note by a person who is neither its maker nor its payee, before
or after indorsement of such note by the payee, shall import the contract
of an ordinary indorsement of negotiable paper ... " This conflict in
statutory enactments is regretable.
18 It must be noted, however, that the change has not been a reversal on
the part of the court in any one jurisdiction but a 1fendency on the part of
courts not committed to the rule of the older cases to adopt the newer view.
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ments characteristics obtaining with regard to negotiable instru-
ments.19 While this attitude may be regarded as unfortunate,
it serves, by sharply distinguishing between negotiable and non-
negotiable paper, to focus attention on the actual status of the
latter.
With the data available it is not possible to evaluate accurately
the significance which should be attached to indorsements on
non-negotiable paper. From a consideration of the varying fact
situations presented to the courts, however, a somewhat clearer
idea of the considerations which are involved may be obtained.
The older cases appear to have regarded the contract of such
indorsers as fixed, much as the contract of indorsement on nego-
tiable instruments is regarded today. It is doubtful that this
position was reached after any very careful examination of the
situations in which such instruments might be used or with re-
gard for the possibility that an indorsement given in one situa-
tion perhaps sfiould not be read in the same terms as if given
in an entirely different situation.
In the case of instruments long regarded as negotiable, but
which on coming before the courts have been declared non-
negotiable, the need of establishing a rule of interpretation is
mainly to settle the particular controversy. Probably the rule
that the transferor is presumed to be a mere assignor, unless
a different intention is shown is as workable as any. This of
course involves releasing such an indorser in case there is no
objective evidence from which an intention to be bound can be
shown. However, to adopt any different rule would probably
involve holding responsible many indorsers who, being supposed-
ly well advised, may have thought they were under no indorser's
responsibility. To predicate a distinction on the extent to which
it may have been generally supposed the particular instrument
was negotiable would be to invite litigation. The real solution
for this group of cases is to reach a clearer statement and inter-
pretation of the N. I. L. and thus prevent such cases from
al-ising.20
'19 Cf. President and Directors of the Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 212 N. Y.
38, 150 N. E. 594 (1926), where, contrary to trade usage, the court believcd
the N. I. L. prevented its holding interim certificates negotiable for the
purpose of protecting a bona fide purchaser from a thief. The court sug-
gested legislation. But compare (1926) 35 YU Lay. Jomn-.M 977, sug-
gesting that the desired result could be obtained without resorting to legis-
lation, and Ashland Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Kerman, 155 N. E. 245 (Ohio App.
1926).
20 Many of the cases cited above were of this type, the question of nego-
tiable form arising from the inclusion in the note of clauses for the payment
of attorneys fees and collection charges. This situation has been largely
settled by § 2 (5), N. L L. Of course with changing conditions there will
continually be used instruments which may be declared non-negotiable
although regarded by the parties as negotiable. The acceleration notes form
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In the many cases where a holder of an admittedly non-nego-
tiable instrument wishes upon transfer to be advised of his
obligations, there is much more difficulty. Many courts seize on
what may have been quite incidental matters in the minds of the
parties, in order to impose an obligation. This makes for uncer-
tainity. For example, and perhaps with good reasons, it has
been held that the inclusion of a waiver of protest in an indorse-
ment on a non-negotiable instrument should be interpreted as
showing an intention to be bound as an indorser.2 1 Again an
indorser of a note, non-negotiable because of the omission of the
word "order" on its face was recently held responsible as indor-
ser by a California court.22 The court considered that the de-
fendant, by adding to his signature the technical words of
negotiability, "pay to the order of" made this instrument, non-
negotiable on its face, negotiable as between the defendant and
all subsequent parties. This extreme view finds support in a few
older cases, 23 but no modern authority has been found for its'
support. Under this theory no responsibility would attach to
the blank indorsement of a non-negotiable instrument. To make
responsibility depend on such considerations is undesirable. The
inclusion of the word "order" or its omission from an indorse-
ment on negotiable instruments is without significance. It is
submitted that the fairest disposition of this group of cases
would be to deny recovery against the indorser unless, of course,
a case could be made showing that the transaction giving rise
to the instrument involved an actual assumption of obligation
on the part of the indorser.2 4 In such case the written signature
of indorsement would be but one element of the indorser's case
and would not be construed as either stating a fixed contract,
as in the case of an indorsement on a negotiable instrument,25
a good illustration of this class. Cf. Thorpe v. Mindeman, 123 Wis. 149,
101 X. W. 417 (1904). The N. I. L. should be amended to generally in-
clude this type of instrument within the negotiable class.
21 Quinn v. Pike, 50 Cal. App. 243, 194 Pac. 761 (1920).
22 Neutzel v. Mackie, 253 Pac. 166 (Cal. 1927).
23 Brenzer v. Wightman, 7 Watts & S. 264 (Pa. 1844); Bay v. Freazor,
1 Bay 66 (S. C. 1789); Carruth v. Walker, 8 Wis. 252 (1859). An interest-
ing question arises as to whether the court would hold the instrument nego-
tiable for all purposes. Would a remote holder take it free of defenses
which the special indorser might have against his indorsee? Of. Carruth
v. Walker, supra at 253, where the court said, "But though the note, as
originally made is not a negotiable note, yet the appellant, by indorsing it
payable to order. . . , made it, as between him and the holder, a negotibale
instrument, and subject to the principles and usages which govern instru-
ments of that character."
24 The case of Cromwell v. Hewitt, supra note 9, was one of this type
although the court did not stress or in fact mention the circumstance.
25 § 66, N. I. L.
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or of stating a prima facie case of, for example, a maker's con-
tract.2 6
The reasons for advocating such a holding are that it seems
doubtful that the indorser in a great many of such cases in-
tended to assume any responsibility, other than the warranties
incident to an assignment of a chose in action. Such a rule, if
the assumption of fact is correct, would have the virtue of cer-
tainty and of greater convenience to users of such paper, as any
other rule would make it necessary that the transferor negative
his responsibility.27
A third situation presents a very different consideration. This
relates to accommodation or irregular indorsers of non-negotiable
instruments. Perhaps this case is to be regarded as merely an
example of a case which merits the test above suggested, and
the indorsee by showing that the indorser signed for security
purposes would be entitled to recover. This has in fact been the
result in all cases apparently, but the conflict in the decisions as
to the measure of responsibility is irreconcilable. By some courts
he has been held as maker 28 by others as guarantor of payment =2
and by others as guarantor of collection. 0 In still others he has
been held responsible only upon proof of the contract under
which his indorsement was made.31 This conflict in decision is
particularly unfortunate as it is believed that cases within this
class are of frequent recurrence. In such case, at least, there is
much to be said in favor of adopting a uniform rule as a guide
for future transactions. The contract best understood and most
nearly fitting the case appears to be that of an indorser on
negotiable paper, although this may be too favorable to the in-
dorser in that it requires strict demand and notice of dishonor. 2
26 See Duchaine v. Phoenix, supra note 15, at 716.
27 The contrary result reached in many cases and provided for by statute
in several cases is perhaps explainable (1) from the fact that all classes
of non-negotiable indorsements have been regarded alike as though there
was a non-negotiable indorser's contract, (2) from the element of unfair-
ness incident to releasing an indorser when all parties had considered the
instrument negotiable and perhaps (3) from an insufficient consideration
of the convenience of parties generally in similar situations.
28 Kidd v. Beckley, 64 W. Va. 80, 60 S. E. 1039 (1908); Sylvester Bleck-
ley Co. v. Alewine, 48 S. C. 308, 26 S. E. 609 (1S97).
29 Weem v. Neblett, 139 Tenn. 655, 202 S. W. 930 (1918) ; see Brown v.
Cook, 77 W. Va. 356, 359, 87 S. E. 454, 455, L. t. A. 1916 D, 220, 222 anno-
tation.
30 Dotson v. Owsley, 141 Ky. 452, 132 S. W. 1037 (1911).
31 Sausey v. Weeks, 122 Ga. 70, 49 S. E. 809 (1905) ; Steele v. Hudson, 30
0kla. 513, 120 Pac. 616 (1911).
32 The Conn. statute referred to supra note 17 apparently adopts this view
and probably mainly with regard to accomodation indorsers inasmuch as
indorsements by maker and payee are not covered.
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APPLICABILITY OF INHERITANCE TAXATION TO CONTRACTS TO DEVISE
OR BEQUEATH
Is the amount of a judgment or decree obtained for breach
of a binding promise to devise or bequeath property subject to
an inheritance tax? The confusion existing as to the theories
on which such a promise may be enforced has resulted in uncer-
tainty as to the taxability of the amount recovered.
Most courts are willing to give some relief where a valuable
consideration has been given in return for an agreement to
leave property by will, and where the testator has failed to keep
the agreement. The majority of courts will allow him to bring
an action for damages against the estate of the promissor for
breach of contract.' In such cases, he receives as damages the
value of the property promised him.2 If the case presents any
ground for equitable jurisdiction, 3 the beneficiary of the promise
may bring a bill in equity asking for relief.4 The relief given
in such an action consists of establishing a constructive trust
on the heirs, executors or devisees holding under the will, in
favor of the beneficiary under the contract agreement. If the
contract entered into is unenforceable because of the Statute of
Frauds, or if the plaintiff elects to disregard the express con-
tract, recovery can be had on a quantum meruit for the consider-
ation given.7 Thus it is seen that by the recovery in equity the
'Ex parte Simons, 247 U. S. 231, 38 Sup. Ct. 497 (1918); PAGE, WILLS
(2d ed. 1926) § 105.
2 This is the general rule. Noyes v. Noyes, 224 Mass. 125, 112 N. E. 850
(1916); Roy v. Pos, 183 Cal. 359, 191 Pac. 542 (1920); 31 A. L. R. 129
(1924) annotation; PAGE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 105. But see Murtha v.
Donohoo, 149 Wis. 481, 136 N. W. 158 (1912); Frieders v. Estate of
Frieders, 180 Wis. 430, 193 N. W. 77 (1923).
3 As to what are grounds for equitable jurisdiction, see PAGE, op. Cit. supra
note 1, §§ 109, 110, 111.
4 Some courts call the relief given by equity specific performance. Winne
v. Winne, 166 N. Y. 263, 59 N. E. 832 (1901); Haubrich v. Haubrich, 118
Minn. 394, 136 N. W. 1025 (1912). Strictly speaking it cannot be so called,
as equity cannot force a dead man to make a will. See Stahl v. Stevenson,
102 Kan. 844, 171 Pac. 1164 (1918). Costigan, Constructive Tiwsts (1915)
28 HARv. L. REv. 237; (1924) 23 MicH. L. REv. 88.
S Phalen v. U. S. Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 178, 78 N. E. 943 (1906) ; Belknap v.
Tillotson, 82 N. J. Eq. 271, 88 Atl. 841 (1913); POMEROY, EQUITABLE REMbE-
DIES (1905) § 746; (1916) 2 IoWA L. BULL. 227.
G Quirk v. Bank of Commerce, 244 Fed. 682 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917); Hens-
ley v. Hilton, 191 Ind. 309, 131 N. E. 38 (1921) ; ScHoULER, WILLS (6th ed.
1923) § 696.
7 Collier v. Rutledge, 136 N. Y. 621, 32 N. E. 626 (1892); Griffith v.
Robertson, 73 Kan. 666, 85 Pac. 748 (1906) ; 31 A. L. R. 141 (1924) annota-
tion. It is also to be noted that a claim for the consideration given or for
the amount promised on the contract can be filed against the promissor's
estate. Gall v. Gall, 27 App. Div. 173, 50 N. Y. Supp. 563 (1st Dept. 1898) ;
Thompson v. Romack, 174 Iowa 155, 156 N. W. 310 (1916). It has even
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beneficiary of the contract gets the same property which he
would have secured had the will been made as agreed upon. Ob-
viously, if the promise was to bequeath a sum of money, the
beneficiary receives the same amount whether he secures it
through the will, by recovery in equity, or by recovery at law for
damages for the breach of the contract.
In a recent New Jersey case, Bcnte v. Bugbce,8 the problem
arose as to whether a recovery at law for damages was taxable
as a transfer by will under the Inheritance Tax La-w2 The plain-
tiff recovered $15,000 on a promise of the deceased to bequeath
her that amount in return for her caring for him for life, which
promise he failed to keep. The Supreme Court, on certiorari to
review the action of the State Comptroller in assessing a tax
on the amount recovered, held that the recovery was a transfer
by will and taxable. On appeal, the Court of Errors and Appeals
reached the opposite conclusion.
At first glance, the decision is to be supported. The plaintiff
recovered from the estate on the ground of contract, and could
hardly have been said to have taken under the will. However,
since the practical result in this case was that the plaintiff re-
ceived the same amount as she would have received had the will
been made, and since such receipt would have been taxable had
the money passed in that manner, it would appear that the
Supreme Court had plausible grounds for holding that the re-
covery by judgment was likewise taxable.10 On the other hand,
the fact that a person recovering by a judgment at law takes,
for some purposes, as a creditor and not as a distributee 1 is an
argument against holding it a transfer by will if it be assumed
that such a phrase has a meaning in vacio. But if the recovery
is in equity, it could be argued from a legalistic standpoint that
been held that no recovery is possible unless a claim has first been presented
to the administrator or executor of the estate. Grant v. Grant, 63 Conn. 5'0,
29 At. 15 (1893) (quantum meruit) ; Morrison v. Land, 109 Cal. 580, 147
Pac. 259 (1915) (action for damages).
8 137 AtI. 552 (N. J. 1927), reversing a decision of the Supreme Court,
134 Atl. 185 (N. J. 1926).
9 "A tax s-hall be and is hereby imposed upon the transfer, of any prop-
erty, real or personal ... to persons or corporations,... in the following
cases:
First. When the transfer is by will or by intestate laws of this State
from any person dying siezed or possessed of the property while a resident
of the State." N. J. Comp. Stat. (Cum. Supp. 1911-24) c. 208, § 537.
10 One objection to this practical argument is the general principle that
a taxing statute cannot be construed beyond its literal meaning. There must
be a distinct authority of law for every levy under the power of the legisla-
ture to tax. CooLEr, TAxATIox (4th ed. 1924) § 1013.
" That is, so far as the order in which the creditor takes from the estate.
In re Todd's Estate, 47 Misc. 35, 95 N. Y. Supp. 211 (Surr. Ct. 1903) ; Car-
roll v. Swift, 10 Ind. App. 170, 37 N. E. 1061 (1894).
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the court does not disturb the mode of transfer, be it by will or
succession, even though the distributee by force of the decree
merely holds the property in trust for the promissee.12 There-
fore there is a transfer by will or succession which is taxable
by the terms of the statute.13 It is clear from the foregoing that
theoretically a plausible argument could be worked out either to
tax or exempt the transfer, depending upon the type of action
brought.
Such considerations show the impossibility of getting any sat-
isfactory results by approaching the question in the manner of
the New Jersey Court, that is, trying to determine abstractly
whether the recovery is really a transfer by will. This is never-
theless the line of reasoning pursued by the two other courts
which have faced this same question. In 1907, the New York
court of Appeals held that a recovery in equity on a contract to
make a devise was taxable as a transfer by will.14 But in 1913, the
Supreme Court of Kansas took a different view, and held that a
similar recovery in equity was not taxable as such a transfer." Re-
garding the decisions from the standpoint of the reasoning on
which the opinions were based, i. e., whether the recovery was to
be called a transfer by will or not, the New Jersey and Kansas de-
cisions are clearly contrary to the New York one. But it is believed
that they can be reconciled factually. The New York case dif-
fered from the other two in one respiect-the recovery there was
by a third party donee beneficiary, and not by the promisee who
had given the consideration, as in the other two cases. Where a
12 This appears to have been the reasoning of the court in Matter of Kidd,
188 N. Y. 274, 80 N. E. 924 (1907).
13 An interesting problem that might arise in this connection is whether
gifts to a relative in a will are taxable, when the relative actually loses
them through a recovery in law or equity; or whether sums recovered by a
relative in such manner are taxable, when the amount recovered comes
within an exemption in the statutes excepting relatives from taxation when
the value of the bequest or devise is less than a stated amount. The an-
swer to this is beyond the scope of the present discussion.
':4 In Matter of Kidd, supra note 12, by an ante-nuptial agreement, a
husband promised to devise property to his step-daughter, for consideration
of $40,000 given by his wife. He failed to make the devise, and the step-
daughter recovered in equity. As indicated, supra note 12, the court ap-
parently based its decision on the fact that there had been a transfer of
the legal title under the will, even though the persons who received were
required, by the decree, to turn over the property at once to the step-
daughter.
" Nelson v. Schoonover, 89 Kan. 779, 132 Pac. 1183 (1913). Husband
and wife agreed to deed all property bought by them to wife, on her prom-
ise to will it to her husband on his death. On her failure to do so, the hus-
band recovered the property in an equitable action. The court based its de-
cision on the ground that the recovery was by contract and not by will.
The question of taxability came up on the petition for rehearing. The
original decision, which does not concern it, is to be found in 8D Kan. 388,
131 Pac. 147 (1913).
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transfer is actually made under the terms of a will, it is taxable
regardless of whether it was a gratuitous gift or based on a
valuable consideration.-G But where the question of taxability
concerns a gift in contemplation of death, an exemption is made
in favor of one based on a valuable consideration, even where
the statute makes no exceptions.17 Likewise, transfers of prop-
erty in settlement of claims against an estate are not taxable,
the relinquishment of the claims being sufficient consideration.
By analogy, then, the same rules could be applied to the situation
of the instant case. Thus the decisions of the Kansas and New
York courts are not necessarily conflicting, because in the latter
case the person receiving the property was a donee beneficiary
who gave no consideration."0 Indeed, the former court indicated
that lack of consideration moving from the beneficiary may be the
criterion of taxability.20 Such a conclusion may not be entirely
satisfactory,2' but it does give a more stable foundation for these
decisions than the metaphysical determination of whether the
property passed by will.
16 Matter of Gould, 156 N. Y. 423, 51 N. E. 287 (1898); Carter v. Craig,
77 N. H. 200, 90 Atl. 598 (1914); Clarke v. Treasurer, 226 Mass. 301, 115
N. E. 416 (1917); (1924) 37 HARV. L. Rsv. 507.
V- In re Orvis, 223 N. Y. 1, 119 N. E. 88 (1918); 7 A. L. R. 1053 (1020)
annotation; (1920) 34 HAnv. L. REV. 198; (192G) 35 YA.E LAW JOuanAL
601.
18 English's Estate v. Crenshaw, 120 Tenn. 531, 110 S. W. 210 (1903);
In re Wells' Estate, 142 Iowa 255, 120 N. W. 713 (1909); MacKenzie v.
Wright, 252 Pac. 521 (Ariz. 1927). In each case, the attempt was made
to tax the settlement as a transfer by will. Whether the person who re-
ceives the property under the will must pay a tax on that part given up by
him in compromise of a claim is not settled. The leading view seems to b2
that he should be taxed, even though he turns over the property to another.
In re Cook's Estate, 187 N. Y. 253, 79 N. E. 991 (1907) ; Ba:ter v. Treas-
urer, 209 Mass. 459, 95 N. E. 854 (1911); Warren, Progzco.s of the Law
(1920) 33 HARV. L. Rnv. 556, 574. Contra: In re Pepper's Estate, 159 Pa.
508, 28 Atl. 353 (1894); State v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 172 N. W.
902 (1919).
1s The cases give no indication of what the law would be if the third
party beneficiary were a creditor, and not a donee beneficiary. By the can-
clusion reached herein, a recovery by a creditor beneficiary hould be held
non-taxable.
20 In the Kansas decision we find this statement, "at all events he had
paid for it, and was not chargeable with an inheritance tax_" [italics ours]
Nelson v. Schoonover, supra note 15, at 784, 132 Pac, at 1185.
21 One criticism has been indicated in the discussion as to whether the
recovery may be classed as a transfer by will or not. The perzon who
receives the property often gets the same by the recovery as he would have
gotten had the will been made as agreed upon. If we hold his recovery not
taxable, the beneficiary escapes a tax if the promisor fails to Icrep the
agreement which he would have had to have paid had the promissor kept
the contract and made the testimentary provision as agreed. But the came
difference exists between a transfer in contemplation of death and a transfer
by will when the transferee furnished a consideration. See cases cited,
supra notes 16 and 17.
